NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
James D. Davies
Review: Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. (New York: Harper and Brothers) Pp. xx, 463.
"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
Mao Tse-Tung
In 1957 the Council on Foreign Relations at Harvard University invited Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to compose a work which would synthesize more than three years of discussion on the formation and implementation of foreign policy in the nuclear age. It was hoped that out of this discussion would grow a framework for the development of future nuclear policy. As the destructive potential of nuclear weapons multiplied, and as nuclear technology proliferated throughout the globe, a new strategy would be vital to govern the military employment of these weapons in order to ensure maximum strategic and defensive potential.
Kissinger's work begins by describing the state of United States military doctrine in the post-World War Two era. If it can be said that war is mankind's greatest impetus for innovation, it may also be said that victory holds the greatest potential for apathy in military thought. Such it was following the Second World War. Not only had the war been won, but the manner in which it had been fought appeared to confirm the accepted doctrine of the day. The enemy had been distinct and had engaged at least part of it's attack directly on U.S. territory. The war had been won by overwhelming the defences of the adversary, and unconditional surrender had been the final political result. Diplomacy had not been considered as a tactic until the achievement of military objectives had ensured that victory was imminent. War was characterized by an ambiguous enemy, all-out conflict, concepts of a surprise attack, and a dependence on superior military technology, namely, the nuclear bomb.
With the advent of hostilities in Korea, military doctrine proven in the Second World War was faced with a contingency for which it was unprepared. Strategically important but not worth committing the entire range of military power, American forces found themselves unable to function efficiently within a concept of a limited war. Although Korea did not represent the primary threat to the American national interest, it did represent a threat of the third order - a country supported by China, but ultimately a puppet of the U.S.S.R. By leaving no option between that of stalemate and all-out war, Kissinger suggests that American foreign policy failed to address the complete range of possible options, and strategically, failed to succeed in Korea.
In the years following the Second World War, the development of thermonuclear technology was taking place at a breathtaking speed. Within ten years, even the simplest atomic weapons exceeded the equivalent of five times the explosive power of all bombs dropped on Germany in four years of war. But with each new development in the horror of thermonuclear weapons, the willingness to actually use them in conflict became a more and more difficult decision in any case save that of a direct threat on the United States itself. In addition, armed forces doctrine was unprepared for any contingency save that of all-out war. Thus war itself had ceased to be a meaningful instrument for achieving even the simplest political goals. Hence we discover Kissinger's primary thesis: that in the absence of a willingness to use all-out war in conflicts of limited yet strategic importance, United States military doctrine must rework itself to include a capacity for the graduated employment of force. Far from an argument for limiting military might, Kissinger argues that it is only because all-out war with the United States would be tantamount to national suicide that the concept of limited war is even possible. For only as long as both combatants believe that keeping the war limited is in their own best interest, the conflict will refrain from becoming all-out and the use of vital strategic resources in limited wars of limited purposes can be avoided.
By drawing on Clauswitz's famous dictum that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, Kissinger's main goal is to elucidate a means by which the concept of warfare may once again be considered a tool useful for international negotiation. Whereas military objectives are often considered by American statesmen to be mutually exclusive of political aims, Kissinger suggests that this policy must be revised if the United States is to be successful when faced with a doctrine which considers the undivided use of military, political, psychological and economic pressures in the promotion of ideology. Throughout his examination of the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, Kissinger concludes that not only is the concept of limited war an accepted communist military strategy, but in fact, the form of conflict best suited to take advantage of the preconceptions and inhibitions of capitalist powers. Effective action, therefore, depends upon the realization that a conflict with the Soviet bloc is likely to be a protracted one. Thus, both diplomacy and war fighting ought to be refined in such a way that communist military doctrine may be used against itself to the benefit of the free world. Success, Kissinger suggests, will be dependant on the ability of American politicians to graduate their actions in both military and diplomatic affairs.
To be certain, many of Kissinger's concepts are not original. Numerous arguments are founded on the ideas of the participants in the study group, notably Nitze and General Gavin. Other authors such as Hart and Brodie had also written on the concept of limited war, but to date Kissinger's work remains the most influential synthesis of ideas on the topic. Nevertheless, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy is probably best read as a primer on strategic military thought at the dawn of the nuclear age. A large part of Kissinger's work is devoted to detailing how military restructure and reorganization could best be carried out in order to suit this new threat of technology. Although much of the highly detailed information presented here would be of interest only to a scholar of contemporary military policy, it is interesting to read about how a war might be fought on a nuclear based battlefield - a contingency with which the world has yet to be faced. Moreover, only by reading Kissinger do we begin to understand how much the present structure of the military has been based on the threat of nuclear warfare. In general then, Kissinger makes interesting reading for any enthusiast of Cold War military strategy.
Despite the intellectual merit of Kissinger's work, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy makes a number of predictions regarding the future state of military technology which have been proven incorrect (such as the idea that the B-52 long range bomber would be obsolete by 1963) and many of which have not yet come to pass (such as the development of nuclear powered aircraft). Kissinger also fails to predict the end of the Cold War and the slow pace of nuclear proliferation throughout the world. More importantly, however, may be Kissinger's inability to explain how a limited war, once under way, could be kept limited. In the end, however, this criticism cannot be used to discredit his general theory of limited war. With the recent advent of friendlier relations between the United States and Russia, it is obvious that the concept of all-out war will be an inadequate tactic to use against modern adversaries of disproportionate military strength. Thus, the concept of all-out war has indeed ceased to be a meaningful instrument of policy in the twenty-first century. It cannot be used against minor powers for fear of the reaction of world opinion and it cannot be used against major powers for fear of mutually assured destruction. Therefore, it remains imperative that this approach continues to be incorporated into United States military doctrine, strategy and foreign relations. For if we fail to do so, victory in and of itself may not be a goal worth achieving.